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Background: Root cause analysis (RCA) originated in the manufacturing engineering sector but has been adapted
for routine use in healthcare to investigate patient safety incidents and facilitate organizational learning. Despite the
limitations of the RCA evidence base, healthcare authorities and decision makers in NHS Scotland – similar to those
internationally - have invested heavily in developing training programmes to build local capacity and capability, and
this is a cornerstone of many organizational policies for investigating safety-critical issues. However, to our
knowledge there has been no systematic attempt to follow-up and evaluate post-training experiences of
RCA-trained staff in Scotland. Given the significant investment in people, time and funding we aimed to capture
and learn from the reported experiences, benefits and attitudes of RCA-trained staff and the perceived impact on
healthcare systems and safety.
Methods: We adapted a questionnaire used in a published Australian research study to undertake a cross sectional
online survey of health care professionals (e.g. nursing & midwifery, medical doctors and pharmacists) formally
trained in RCA by a single territorial health board region in NHS Scotland.
Results: A total of 228/469 of invited staff completed the survey (48%). A majority of respondents had yet to
participate in a post-training RCA investigation (n=127, 55.7%). Of RCA-experience staff, 71 had assumed a lead
investigator role (70.3%) on one or more occasions. A clear majority indicated that their improvement
recommendations were generally or partly implemented (82%). The top three barriers to RCA success were cited as:
lack of time (54.6%), unwilling colleagues (34%) and inter-professional differences (31%). Differences in agreement
levels between RCA-experienced and inexperienced respondents were noted on whether a follow-up session
would be beneficial after conducting RCA (65.3% v 39.4%) and if peer feedback on RCA reports would be of
educational value (83.2% v 37.0%). Comparisons with the previous research highlighted significant differences such
as less reported difficulties within RCA teams (P<0.001) and a greater proportion of respondents taking on RCA
leadership roles in this study (P<0.001).
Conclusion: This study adds to our knowledge and understanding of the need to improve the effectiveness of RCA
training and frontline practices in healthcare settings. The overall evidence points to a potential organisational
learning need to provide RCA-trained staff with continuous development opportunities and performance feedback.
Healthcare authorities may wish to look more critically at whom they train in RCA, and how this is delivered and
supported educationally to maximize cost-benefits, organizational learning and safer patient care.* Correspondence: paul.bowie@nes.scot.nhs.uk
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Root cause analysis (RCA) is a structured approach to the
investigation of patient safety incidents that is commonly
applied in many modern health systems worldwide, par-
ticularly in acute hospital settings [1]. The RCA technique
originated in the engineering industry as a method of
identifying latent systems-based issues that contributed to
underperformance, variations or design failures in mech-
anical production processes [2]. Its inherent principles
have been adapted in many high reliability organisations –
such as the petro-chemical, nuclear power, aerospace and
aviation industries – to systematically uncover and im-
prove underlying systems problems, and ergonomic and
cultural issues identified as contributory factors in work-
related accidents and incidents [3,4].
In healthcare, safety-based RCA investigations (or var-
iants of this approach) were first introduced in the 1990s
to facilitate organisational learning [5]. There is general
consensus that RCA utilises a ‘toolbox rather than a single
method’ with team-led investigations typically attempting
to ascertain the ‘what, how and why’ of identified patient
safety incidents [4]. To achieve this, a small multi-
disciplinary team of appointed investigators often draws
on a multitude of analytical and problem-solving techni-
ques [4-6] such as Brainstorming, Pareto Analysis, the
Five-Whys technique and Fault-Tree-Analysis to accom-
plish these aims using recommended step-wise processes
(Table 1). Once ‘root causes’ are established by investiga-
tors, different levels of local team-based and wider
organizational learning needs are determined and a series
of improvement recommendations formulated which, if
implemented, should minimize the risk of incident recur-
rence [2-5]. It should be noted that, broadly speaking, in
general medical practice settings particularly in the United
Kingdom (UK), significant event analysis (a less rigorous
investigative method based on reflective learning theory)
rather than RCA is the routinely applied technique of
choice for historical and feasibility reasons [7].Table 1 The seven steps for root cause analysis (RCA)
team investigation details
Seven Steps to RCA [2] Team-based RCA Incident
Investigations [6,8]




2. Organise a team to carry out
the RCA
Agree terms of reference
3. Study the work processes Agree methods for
gathering evidence
4. Collect the facts Interrogate, discuss and
analyse evidence
5. Search for causes Draft recommendations
for service improvement
6. Take action
7. Evaluate the actions takenThe evidence base underpinning the effectiveness of
RCA in healthcare as a method to gain an in-depth under-
standing of safety issues and facilitate improvements to
prevent future incidents is equivocal [9,10]. Controlled
trials to test the efficacy of the RCA framework are lacking.
Some individual studies of single incident investigations re-
port positive evidence such as the implementation of
‘strong’ corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events
as judged by the authors of a recent RCA review in medi-
cine [9].
However in an evaluation of 445 RCAs undertaken in
New South Wales to identify and theme learning needs
related to patient, human (staff ) and systems factors, the
authors concluded that the effectiveness of RCA as a
means by which staff can achieve the desired improve-
ments in patient care that were recommended was lim-
ited [10]. A recent literature review of RCA effectiveness
by Percarpio et al. (2008) identified a small number of
formal published studies of relevance [11]. They high-
lighted ‘numerous theoretical problems with the analyt-
ical framework’ and called for more research ‘at the
system level and cost-benefits analysis. . .to determine the
effectiveness of RCA’. Additionally, Vincent (2004)
describes the RCA methodological approach as ‘mislead-
ing’ and suggests that “incident analysis, properly under-
stood, is not a retrospective search for root causes” but
should be framed in terms of the incident acting as a
‘window’ on the ‘gaps and inadequacies’ of the health-
care system [6].
Despite this, it is evident that healthcare authorities and
decision-makers have high expectations for the transfer-
ability of RCA as an improvement tool, particularly since
it seems to be successfully established in non-healthcare
industry to investigate safety-critical issues, albeit in argu-
ably more linear and less complex institutional settings
[12-15]. Moreover a range of external healthcare bodies
with regulatory, accreditation or quality management
oversights expect care provider organisations to have
transparent incident reporting and investigation mechan-
isms in place. In the past decade the National Patient
Safety Agency in England and Wales has strongly pro-
moted the adoption of RCA and developed an in-depth
training programme and online educational resources to
build capacity in this area and support healthcare organi-
sations and staff in explicit efforts to make patient care
safer [16,17].
Similarly in the National Health Service in Scotland
(NHSiS) many territorial health authorities have invested
heavily in providing internal or external training in RCA
methods to a range of staff groups, and this is a corner-
stone of their organizational policies for investigating pa-
tient safety incidents. However, to our knowledge there
has been no systematic attempt to follow-up and evalu-
ate the post-training experiences, benefits and attitudes
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RCA methods, and then put this knowledge into prac-
tice in the workplace when required to by their employ-
ing organisation. Given this significant investment in
people, time and funding, it is important to capture and
learn from the reported outcomes of this type of educa-
tional intervention, and its subsequent impact in the
healthcare system and on improving patient safety.
In this study we aimed to:
1. Measure the extent to which respondents had
subsequently participated in formal RCA
investigations and also assumed a lead investigator
role.
2. Determine the extent to which improvement
recommendations arising from RCA investigations
were actually implemented.
3. Ascertain if respondents encountered a range of
barriers to RCA practice previously cited in the
literature.
4. Establish participants’ perceptions of the adequacy of
RCA training provided and their attitudes to the
value of the tool as an improvement method in the
healthcare workplace.
5. Compare relevant aspects of our findings with those
reported in a previous Australian study [18] as one
way of gauging progress with RCA training and
impact in a different setting and at a different point
in time.
Methods
Design, participants and setting
Cross sectional design utilizing an online questionnaire
survey of healthcare professionals (e.g. medical and
nursing & midwifery) based in a single (anonymised)
territorial health board region in NHSiS who had
attended RCA training either internally-run or exter-
nally sanctioned by the clinical risk department in a pre-
vious 36-month period. We left a 2-month gap to allow
newly-trained staff the opportunity to experience in-
volvement in RCA investigations.Data collection
We adapted a questionnaire used in the aforemen-
tioned Australian study [18] by Braithwaite et al.
(2006) and piloted this with six colleagues who had
previously attended RCA training. Minor alterations to
questionnaire wording and style were then made to
suit local circumstances. For example, we altered the
rating scale for two items: ‘RCAs should be conducted
by colleagues with a clinical background and not by
staff out-with your department’ and ‘patients and rela-
tives should be part of the RCA team’, to free-textresponses to provide opportunities for more detailed
answers from respondents. We added a statement
‘when you were involved in an RCA(s), to what extent
did you encounter interference from internal/external
sources’, to reflect a recent research finding. Unlike the
Australian survey we included those healthcare profes-
sionals who were trained in RCA but did not subse-
quently participate in or lead an incident investigation
and compared their responses with those who had.
We identified staff names and email addresses from the
organizational database of all those who had attended
RCA training in the chosen study period. During May and
June 2011, we emailed a cover note explaining the study
purpose and the online link to the web-based survey tool
(QuestBack) to all participants. Non-respondents were fol-
lowed up on three occasions via automatically generated
email reminders.
Data were collected from respondents on: participa-
tion rates and leadership roles in RCA investigations;
the extent to which RCA improvement recommenda-
tions were implemented; encountered barriers to con-
ducting RCA; and attitudes to the adequacy of RCA
training and the analytical process. A range of Likert-
type scales was used to assess attitudinal strength.
Free text responses were thematically analysed [19] by
the authors independently with consensus reached over
any discrepancies.Statistical analysis
The data were coded in Microsoft Excel software and
exported to SPSS version 17.0. Characteristics of respon-
dents including gender, professional groups, healthcare
sector, job experience and RCA training details were sum-
marized using simple descriptive statistics. We divided
respondents into two groups: Group One consisted of
those who had led or participated in one or more RCA
investigations since training; and Group Two consisted of
those who had not achieved either task. We compared
group responses to attitudinal statements using chi-square
analyses to determine statistical differences, and also Fish-
er’s Exact Test where necessary. Levene’s test was used to
confirm the assumption of equal variance between groups.
Differences in perceptions and characteristics between
groups were considered statistically significant if p<0.05.
We also calculated differences in proportions of responses
to selected questionnaire items along with 95% confidence
intervals and made direct comparisons with the findings
of Braithwaite et al. (2006) [18].Ethical review
The study was pre-screened by the west of Scotland
Research Ethics Committee but did not require formal
ethical approval.
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Response rate, respondent characteristics and
demographics
A total of 228/469 of invited healthcare professionals com-
pleted the survey (48%). Table 2 outlines details of re-
spondent characteristics and demographics together with
background information on when they attended RCA
training, the type of training received and how long theTable 2 Respondent characteristics, demographics and RCA t
Characteristic Participated or led
Yes n=101 (%) No
Training
When did you attend RCA training?
≤6 months ago 4 (4.0)
7-11 months ago 8 (7.9)
12-24 months ago 39 (38.6)
>24 months ago 50 (49.5)
What type of training did you receive?
NHS (in-house) 80 (79.2)
Tutor 14 (13.9)
Combination (e-learning, above, external) 7 (6.9)
How long was the training?
≤One day 88 (87.1)
1-2 days 12 (11.9)












Primary care 19 (18.8)
Acute sector 55 (54.5)
Mental health 13 (12.9)
NHS Board HQ 8 (7.9)
Other 5 (5.0)
Years experience in current job
≤5 years 25 (24.8)
6-10 years 22 (21.8)
11-15 years 13 (12.9)
>15 years 41 (40.6)training lasted. The great majority of participants were fe-
male (176, 77.2%), with the largest group of respondents
coming from the nursing & midwifery professions (99,
43.4%), and those based in the acute sector (91, 39.9%).
Most participants attended a one-day in-house RCA train-
ing event (181, 81.1%).
We compared the professional characteristics and
demographic details of Group One and Group Tworaining details
RCA Total Chi-square
n=127 (%) n=228 (%) value df p-value
13.5 3 0.004
12 (9.4) 16 (7.0)
25 (19.7) 33 (14.5)
52 (40.9) 91 (39.9)
38 (29.9) 88 (38.6)
0.486 2 0.784
105 (82.7) 185 (81.1)
14 (11.0) 28 (12.3)
8 (6.3) 15 (6.6)
1.156 2 0.561
115 (90.6) 203 (89.0)
10 (7.9) 22 (9.6)
2 (1.6) 3 (1.3)
1.097 1 0.295
24 (18.9) 49 (21.5)
101 (79.5) 176 (77.2)
10.082 4 0.039
54 (42.5) 99 (43.4)
6 (4.7) 14 (6.1)
24 (18.9) 54 (23.7)
20 (15.7) 27 (11.8)
23 (18.1) 33 (14.5)
22.046 4 <0.001
40 (31.5) 59 (25.9)
36 (28.3) 91 (39.9)
22 (17.3) 35 (15.4)
6 (4.7) 14 (6.1)
22 (17.3) 27 (11.8)
5.181 3 0.159
25 (19.7) 50 (21.9)
17 (13.4) 39 (17.1)
16 (12.6) 29 (12.7)
69 (54.3) 110 (48.2)
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associated with a greater likelihood of involvement in or
leading an RCA: being based in the acute sector or NHS
Board head quarters (P<0.001); increasing duration of
time since training (P<0.05) and belonging to the man-
agement or nursing & midwifery professional groups
(P<0.05). Other factors such as the type and duration of
training and respondents’ gender and job experience
were not statistically associated with RCA involvement
or leadership.
Post-training involvement in RCA investigations
The majority of respondents reported that they had
acquired no post-training involvement in any RCA investi-
gations since being trained (127, 55.7%) and cited the fol-
lowing reasons: ‘no opportunity’ to do so (101, 86.6%); ‘lack
of support’ (5, 3.9%); and ‘inadequate training’ (1, 0.8%).
Table 3 displays a numerical breakdown of respon-
dents’ reported levels of RCA involvement. 101 respon-
dents (44.3%) indicated that they had participated in an
RCA investigation with 71 assuming a lead investigator
role (70.3%) on one or more occasion. Of this group,
around 41% had led one RCA investigation with almost
20% reporting a leadership role in five or more investiga-
tions since undergoing training.
RCA recommendations: implementation, benefits and
barriers
A clear majority of respondents (83, 82%) indicated that
the improvement recommendations made as part of their
RCA investigations were generally implemented, or partly
implemented. Table 4 outlines selected examples of the
perceived benefits of participating in the RCA process and
other comments about RCA practices that were reported
by study participants.
Table 5 outlines a range of commonly known barriers to
conducting RCA investigations. In descending order, the
top three barriers cited as ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ encoun-
tered were lack of time (54, 54.6%), unwilling colleagues
(33, 34%) and inter-professional differences (30, 31%). Just
under 40% of respondents indicated that outside interfer-
ence from internal or external sources was also a barrier
to some degree during their RCA investigations.Table 3 Respondents’ reported levels of RCA participation
RCA
Investigations




(n) n=71 (%) n=74 (%
1 29 (40.8) 30 (40.5
2 18 (25.4) 20 (27.0
3 9 (12.7) 9 (12.2
4 1 (1.4) 4 (5.4)
≥5 14 (19.7) 11 (14.9Attitudes to RCA training and the RCA process: group
comparisons
RCA training
A clear majority of all respondents (178, 76.8%) indicated
‘yes’ or ‘partly’ to the question on whether they had suffi-
cient understanding/confidence by the end of the training
to conduct an RCA (Table 6). A smaller majority ticked
‘yes’ or ‘partly’ (49, 119, 51.3%) when reporting if their
work practices regarding safety and reporting errors had
changed since attending the RCA training course. Overall,
respondents agreed that they were now: better trained in
methods of dealing with incidents (76.5%); more able to
improve work processes for the provision of safer clinical
care; and of the belief that RCA training can contribute to
the advancement of safety in healthcare. There was no
clear statistical differences in responses to statements by
both groups apart from one very obvious statement on
whether the training provided respondents with the skills
to be involved in or lead RCA in the workplace, with a
greater proportion of those who had actually participated
in RCA in agreement (P=0.008).RCA process
Respondents with post-training experience of RCA inves-
tigations were more likely to agree that the benefits asso-
ciated with training are worth the investment (73.2% v
(65.4%) and that conducting RCA was a good use of staff
time (86.2% v 77.6%) than those with no post-training ex-
perience, although overall agreement with the statements
was high (Table 7). Similar differences in levels of agree-
ment between both groups were noted when asked if a
follow-up session after conducting RCA would be benefi-
cial (65.3% v 39.4%) and if receiving confidential peer feed-
back on the RCA report would benefit their learning
(83.2% v 37.0%), although significant minorities were un-
sure in both instances. In terms of who should be involved
in RCA investigations, respondents had divided views on
whether these should be conducted by clinical staff only,
with well over half disagreeing or indicating that they
were unsure about this (116/179, 64.8%). A small majority
of respondents (101/178, 56.7%) answered ‘agree’ or
‘maybe’ to the statements on whether patients orticipated in RCA
ations








Table 4 Comments by health care professional respondents on RCA practices
Positive benefits
• Working locally with teams and supporting staff during the process
• Reflecting on the outcomes of the implementation of the recommendations and action plans, and observing the
consequent improvements in patient safety and service delivery
• Allowed you to step back and look objectively at the situation without being too close and avoid the wood for
the trees scenario
• Staff feeling there was a real attempt to look for improvements rather than blame
• I believe it has brought reproductive medicine and obstetrics & gynaecology theatres together more as a team
• Everyone involved could see the benefit of getting to the roots of the issue so that it wouldn’t happen again, or
at least the risks of it happening were reduced
• Reassuring staff that RCA is trying to identify ways of learning from mistakes. . .and not to punish.
• Staff started to understand the importance of problem-solving and the breaking down of a blame culture
• Team of people involved felt listened to and understood
• Outcome reflection raised awareness and attitude change to how we can do things differently and improve the
patient experience
• Clarifying what was the actual cause of the problem. It is not always what seems obvious. And working out what
can be done to prevent a recurrence.
• Confidence that the situation was being examined in a systematic & comprehensive way
• Getting the problem sorted in a positive manner and every one learning from it
RCAs should be conducted
by clinical staff only
• Disagree, useful to have input from those removed from the situation.
• Clinical input essential in clinical cases - but objective input to provide different perspective can be valuable in any
investigation
• I think assistance from a dedicated team might help, especially if you don’t have alot of experience in completing
regularly.
• It is of benefit to have a understanding of the area however not necessarily should an RCA be carried out by staff
within department.
• It depends very much on the incident reported who should be involved. There may be incidents such as case
notes going missing which involved other groups of staff , not just those from a clinical background.
• Yes but with help from other clinical staff who have undertaken an RCA
• It should also involve staff out-with your own clinical area to allow a more balanced view i think.
• needs a mix and definite somebody removed from situation
• Should be conducted by colleagues within clinical background however fresh eyes can often help in some
situations
• No, the most appropriate person should lead. It's good on occasions to have someone independent
Patients or relatives should be
involved in RCA investigations
• Yes I believe they should if they are willing
• It would depend on the nature of the incident being investigated.
• Possibly - would depend on the situation and training available.
• No - will not necessarily be appropriate as emotions can develop and are not helpful.
• It might be useful to have “specialist” patient/carer representatives involved - i.e. ones with some real experience
of the patient/carer perspective plus RCA training, but who were not personally involved in the particular incident.
• A patient liaison officer maybe more appropriate to avoid upset or distress to a patient or relatives
• No, I think it would be difficult for others to share their opinion in discussion if they were present, but it may be
appropriate at times to meet with relatives or patients before and/or after an RCA has been conducted
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Table 5 Respondents who participated in and led RCA investigations: reported barriers to RCA and extent to which
recommendations were implemented (n=101)
Survey item Participants responding, n (%)
Generally speaking, were your recommendations implemented? (n=98) No Partly Yes Unsure
1 (1.0) 42 (41.6) 41 (40.6) 14 (13.9)
Did you encounter the following barriers? Always Sometimes Unsure Occasionally Never
Unwilling colleagues (n=97) 4 (4.1) 29 (29.9) 3 (3.1) 18 (18.6) 43 (44.3)
Unsupportive management (n=97) 1 (1.0) 12 (12.4) 2 (2.1) 11 (11.3) 71 (73.2)
Lack of resources (n=95) 6 (6.3) 14 (14.7) 11 (11.6) 33 (34.7) 31 (32.6)
Lack of time (n=99) 17 (17.2) 37 (37.4) 0 (0.0) 25 (25.3) 20 (20.2)
Interference from internal/external sources (n=96) 2 (2.1) 16 (16.7) 8 (8.3) 12 (12.5) 58 (60.4)
Difficulty with RCA teams (n=93 1 (1.1) 3 (3.2) 10 (10.8) 12 (12.9) 67 (72.0)
Lack of feedback and data (n=94 6 (6.4) 13 (13.8) 7 (7.4) 23 (24.5) 45 (47.9)
Inter-professional differences (n=97) 2 (2.1) 28 (28.9) 3 (3.1) 26 (26.8) 38 (39.2)
Mean for all barriers (%) 5.1% 19.8% 5.7% 20.8% 48.6%
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for related comments).
Comparison with selected study findings of Braithwaite
et al. (2008)
Similar to the previous Australian study [18] we found
no differences in the professional characteristics of those
who had conducted a post-training RCA and those who
had not, while those staff in both studies with RCA ex-
perience had undertaken multiple investigations.Table 6 Levels of agreement: attitudinal comparisons by resp
impact
Survey items Group 1: Respondents





Yes Partly No Unsure Yes
Did you have sufficient
understanding/confidence by the end









Have your work practices regarding
safety and reporting errors changed







Agree Unsure Disagree Agree
Have you been able to apply the
knowledge gained from your RCA
training to your workplace?
38
(37.6)
3 (3.0) 59 (58.4) 46
(36.2)
Since undertaking RCA training do
you think you are better trained in







Since undertaking RCA training can
you improve work processes for







Over the long term, will RCA training








In general, did the RCA training
provide you with the skills to be






(55.9)However, we found that a greater proportion of respon-
dents in our study had led a post-training RCA investi-
gation compared with the earlier Australian study [(76/
101, 75.2% v 133/252, 52.8%, diff=22.4%, 95% CI 11.4 to
32.1%, P<0.001)]. We also noted that our respondents
cited (‘always’ and ‘sometimes’) the following barriers
less frequently than their Australian counterparts: ‘lack
of time’ [(54/99, 54.6% v 189/252, 75.0%, diff=20.5%,
95% CI 9.4 to 31.4%, P<0.001)]; ‘difficulty within RCA
teams’ [(4/93, 4.3% v 86/252, 34.2%, diff=29.8%, 95% CIondent groups towards safety skills acquired and RCA
p 2: Respondents
did not participate in
d RCA n=127 (%)
All respondents n=228 (%) Chi Square
























5 (2.2) 5.786 3 0.122
Unsure Disagree Agree Unsure Disagree χ2 Df P
































20 (8.8) 9.68 2 0.008
Table 7 Levels of agreement: attitudinal comparisons by respondent groups towards value of RCA process and need
for further education











Agree Unsure Disagree Agree Unsure Disagree Agree Unsure Disagree χ2 Df P
Considering the health systems investment in RCA














9 (4.0) 6.347 2 0.042
Undertaking a RCA is a time-consuming business. Is it













9 (3.9) 6.591 2 0.037
Yes No Unsure Yes No Unsure Yes No Unsure χ2 Df P
Do you think a follow-up training session after you
















Would receiving confidential peer-feedback on your
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34.0% v 112/252, 44.5%, diff=10.4%, 95% CI −1.1 to
21.1%, P=0.077)]; and ‘lack of feedback and data’ [(19/94,
20.2% v 96/251, 38.3%, diff=8.1%, 95% CI 7.2 to 27.3%,
P=0.002)]. A further significant difference was high-
lighted in terms of RCA improvement recommendations
with a greater proportion of Scottish respondents report-
ing that these were implemented or partly implemented
[(83/98, 84.5% v 175/252, 69.4%, diff=15.1%, 95% CI 5.3
to 23.6%, P=0.004)].
Discussion
The main findings provide a measure of the extent to
which healthcare staff trained in RCA actually partici-
pated in subsequent investigations in the workplace. It is
clear in this study that a majority has yet to do so with
the greatest proportion of trained but inexperienced staff
being based out-with the acute care sector. This is a
concern given the resources committed to RCA training
and the implications in terms of lost opportunities to
improve patient safety and organizational learning, as
well as the potentially discouraging impact on staff mor-
ale and attitudes. Previous research has reported con-
cerns from RCA-trained staff that they may lack
‘personal control’ over participation in subsequent inci-
dent investigations which is likely, for many, to be a de-
cision for local managers in their organisations and
heavily dependent upon workload priorities [16-18,20].
The ‘failure of work schedules’ to provide staff with pro-
tected time for RCA investigations was cited as the major
difficulty by Braithwaite et al. [18]. Edmonson (2004) sug-
gests that leadership has a critical role in this regard in
developing an environment of ‘psychological safety’ to en-
courage a greater willingness for transparency, questioning
and sharing of concerns, and also in ‘supporting and
empowering’ team learning across the organisation [21].
Nicoloni et al. (2011) also suggest that leaders need toopenly endorse RCA (or a variant) as an improvement
method and the staff who have been trained to implement
it [8]. Without this type of approach then it is possible that
local leaders will continue to forfeit opportunities to learn
from RCA by occasionally or even frequently assigning a
low priority to investigations or blocking participation in
the process by trained staff.
Most respondents with RCA experience report mul-
tiple exposures to incident investigations. Similar to pre-
vious research [9-11,16-19,21,22], a clear majority also
report that their recommendations to make care safer
are at least partly or fully implemented in their organisa-
tions, although determining how effective these potential
improvements actually were was not a study aim but
nonetheless should be a subject of further research given
the limited evidence.
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that RCA investigators
will be subject to some form of ‘criticism’ or ‘conflict’ from
‘powerful’ individuals or groups, or those with vested inter-
ests, within a healthcare organisation [22]. It should also be
remembered that in essence RCA involves healthcare pro-
fessionals ‘not just scrutinizing each other but scrutinizing
each others’ errors’. Many respondents encountered a range
of organizational barriers to conducting RCA investigations
similar to those reported previously [18]. A few significant
differences were apparent, however, with respondents in
our study more likely to adopt a post-training RCA leader-
ship role and also report less difficulty with some of the
organizational barriers outlined. One interpretation is that
the differences indirectly hint at a slightly more positive
organizational safety culture being reported in our study,
which is possible given the large-scale national initiatives to
improve patient safety in the Scottish health service over
recent years [15]. However a more likely explanation is that
the Australian study [18] is more than five years older and
so associated cultural factors such as the prevailing atti-
tudes and behaviours towards RCA investigations and
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match those in our study findings – not that the results
reported here offer some type of benchmark.
Similar to other studies, our RCA-experienced respon-
dents were generally positive about the training they
received and the cost-benefits of this investigation tech-
nique in terms of the ‘advancement of safety in healthcare’
and being a ‘good use of staff time and resources’
[16,18,20]. Respondents displayed mixed views - sup-
ported by seemingly logical arguments on both sides - on
whether non-clinical colleagues and patients should have
a role in incident investigations. However, many risk man-
agers are non-clinical and this does not seem to have been
a barrier to them leading on RCA training or advising on,
or participating in, related investigations. The involvement
of patients and relatives in these investigations is strongly
encouraged in national policy [12-15], but the reality is
that this appears to be a rarity perhaps because of the
many sensitivities and difficulties outlined by our respon-
dents, even if many were positive about the prospect.
Most respondents had a sufficient ‘understanding/con-
fidence’ in conducting RCA and indicated that their
work practices and reporting of errors have changed
since being trained. A follow-up training session and the
use of confidential peer feedback on RCA reports were
viewed as potentially beneficial educational interven-
tions, suggesting that many respondents may have a
level of insight into the need for further learning around
the often complex and problematic issues involved in
applying the technique. The inconsistent quality of RCA
attempts and the need for additional post-training sup-
port has been noted previously [17,19]. The study by
Wallace et al. (2009) reports high levels of satisfaction
with RCA training, but low levels of correct responses
when study participants were subsequently tested on
their acquired knowledge of RCA using pre-designed
vignettes [16].
Overall the evidence demonstrates that the standard of
incident analysis and report writing is frequently variable
[7,16,17,19]. Given that the written report is a key proxy
for the quality of the investigation undertaken then it is
likely that some type of educational feedback interven-
tion is necessary. Offering developmental support and
mentorship, particularly to guide less experienced staff
confronting and dealing with some of the aforemen-
tioned barriers to RCA, and when writing comprehen-
sive unambiguous reports that offer realistic
recommendations for improvement (either during train-
ing or after training or both), arguably makes sense in
closing this educational gap. Taken together the com-
bined evidence from this and other studies cited may
point to an organisational learning need for continuous
development and feedback for RCA-trained staff, or at
least in the short-term [7,16,18,20].The study findings are not generalisable beyond the RCA
training practices in this single health authority. But given
the degree of congruence with Braithwaite et al. [18] and
specific findings in previous research [9-11,16,17,19,21,22],
it is possible that similar issues would be uncovered in
other regions and countries with comparable training
arrangements, particularly with regard to the significant
proportion of trained staff who do not gain any post-
training investigation experience. A key consideration,
therefore, will be the cost-benefits involved in taking
healthcare staff out of frontline clinical duties to provide
them with RCA training and then failing to utilize or sup-
port them in the post-training phase.
One potential option is to better select staff for more
intensive RCA training, while training less staff numbers
so that organisations develop a strong core grouping
with the requisite experience, expertise and leadership
skills - augmented by the provision of continuous devel-
opmental support. Potentially this offers a number of
advantages over current arrangements. A better trained
and dedicated RCA staff group which is afforded greater
opportunities to gain experience may retain and
strengthen their analytical knowledge and skills and also
benefit from shared peer-to-peer learning – leading to
more meaningful and effective incident investigations. In
developing this ‘expert community of practice’, these indi-
viduals (or as a group) may also become better equipped
to highlight and challenge existing institutional barriers to
engaging in and learning from incident investigation and
start to make progress in developing a more positive safety
culture. However, this will require organisations – and,
perhaps more specifically, local healthcare leaders - to give
greater priority to investigations and provide some elem-
ent of protected time for these staff to continue to develop
related experience and expertise when necessary. In some
cases this may require a paradigm shift in local middle
management and executive level attitudes and behaviours
towards improving patient safety that goes beyond purely
rhetorical endorsement of this concept as the single most
important healthcare priority. A recent high profile media
exposure of inconsistencies around serious patient safety
incident investigation practices across NHSiS may have
some impact in this regard [23].
Strengths and limitations
Our survey generated a moderate response rate although
respondent numbers were still significantly large enough
for useful statistical inferences and adding to our know-
ledge and understanding in this topic area. A number of
limitations are associated with this type of descriptive
cross sectional survey. It is likely that a proportion of non-
respondents will have changed posts and therefore email
addresses since RCA training and so could not be tracked
using the online survey system. There may have been
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the characteristics of responders and non-responders as
well as recall bias given the time lag between training and
completing the questionnaire experienced by some. Also,
self-report data may not be fully reliable as there is no
means of independent verification. Caution should there-
fore be exercised when extrapolating these findings for
more general purposes.Conclusion
The study quantified some important problems within a
single NHS board’s RCA training programme which will
be of wider interest in Scotland and internationally. This
adds to our knowledge and understanding of the need to
improve the effectiveness of related training and front-
line practices in healthcare settings. There is an assump-
tion that organizations can train staff in RCA and learn
from associated outcomes as if it is a linear, “rational,
robust and rigorous process” [8,22]. However, healthcare
authorities may wish to look more critically at the system
and cultural complexities which impact RCA investiga-
tions; the professional groupings and numbers of staff
whom they select to attend training; and how these pro-
grammes are delivered and supported educationally in the
longer term to maximize cost-benefits, organizational
learning and safer patient care. A deeper understanding of
the socio-cultural issues at play is also necessary, but this
will require a policy commitment to resource more in-
depth social research and evaluation, particularly if devel-
oping, testing and implementing new training paradigms.
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